tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6432111.post2583125509669544840..comments2023-10-24T09:18:35.229+01:00Comments on Theories 'n Things: Aristotelian indeterminacy and partial beliefsRobbie Williamshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6432111.post-59069271002815557822009-11-23T14:53:44.073+00:002009-11-23T14:53:44.073+00:00Great story as for me. I'd like to read a bit ...Great story as for me. I'd like to read a bit more about that matter.<br />BTW check the design I've made myself <a href="http://www.admirableescorts.com/high_class_escorts_london.html" rel="nofollow">High class escort</a>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6432111.post-29847300339201804642008-02-14T21:30:00.000+00:002008-02-14T21:30:00.000+00:00Hi Jason,Yes, sorry, that passage in particular is...Hi Jason,<BR/><BR/>Yes, sorry, that passage in particular is badly put. My thought is that the revisionist supervaluationist is in trouble with these cases. But I think it's quite tricky to be a non-revisionist supervaluationist. <BR/><BR/>Assuming you don't want to go in for the fancy footwork I explore in the "supervaluational consequence" paper, I see two ways of to be a "non-revisionary supervaluationist". The first is to drop the identification of truth with supertruth. The second is to allow that identification, but to drop the Williamson-style link between truth and validity (i.e. go for local rather than global validity). <BR/><BR/>I'm actually happy with dropping the truth=supertruth in some settings (e.g. to go for Elizabeth's supervaluation-ish treatment of metaphysical indeterminacy). I think it's hard to drop truth=supertruth *and* maintain you're giving a semantic theory of vagueness (though maybe not impossible... I sketched some ideas in my thesis about how to cash out "determinately" in such a setting metasemantically). <BR/><BR/>I think maintaining truth=supertruth but using local consequence has bad results. It gets nasty in a multi-conclusion setting, where it allows valid arguments with all-true premises and all-untrue conclusions. For an easy example, let A be indeterminate, and consider Av~A|-A,~A. That's locally but not globally valid for the supervaluationist. The premise is supertrue. But neither conclusion is true. I don't like that at all.Robbie Williamshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6432111.post-35632246894008495212008-02-14T12:59:00.000+00:002008-02-14T12:59:00.000+00:00Hey Robbie,Cool post. Just one clarificatory quest...Hey Robbie,<BR/><BR/>Cool post. Just one clarificatory question (unless maybe your paper answers it -- I haven't read that yet). When you say<BR/><BR/><I>All of these reactions will concede the broader point---that at least in this case, we’ve got an independent grip on what the probabilities should be, and that gives us traction against the Supervaluationist.</I><BR/><BR/>do you mean the <I>revisionist</I> supervaluationist, or any supervaluationist at all? At first, I was thinking, "Cool, this tells us why we should take the 'preserve-the-classical-logic' line towards our supervaluationist semantics." But when I got to that spot, I thought maybe you were impugning supervaluationist techniques in general. So I wasn't quite sure what the take-home lesson was supposed to be.Jasonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08511374467709845882noreply@blogger.com