(The idea of having supervaluation-style treatments of ontic vagueness isn't unknown in the literature however: in a couple of papers, Ken Akiba argues for this kind of treatment of ontic vagueness, though his route to this framework is pretty different to the one I like. And Elizabeth Barnes has been thinking and writing about the the kind of modal treatments of ontic vagueness for a while, and I owe huge amounts to conversations with her about all of these issues. Her take on these matters is very close to the one I like (non-coincidentally) and those interested should check out her papers for systematic discussion and defense of the coherence of ontic vagueness in this spirit.)
The project in my paper wasn't to argue that there was ontic vagueness, or even tell you what ontic vagueness (constitutively) is. The project was just to set up a framework for talking about, and reasoning about, metaphysically vague matters, with a particular eye to evaluate the Evans argument against ontically vague identity. In particular, the framework I gave has no chance of giving any sort of reduction of metaphysical indeterminacy, since that very notion was used in defining up bits of the framework. (I'm actually pretty attracted to the view that the right way to think about these things would be to treat indeterminacy as a metaphysical primitive, in the way that some modalists might treat contingency. See this previous blog post. I was later pointed to this excellent paper by David Barnett where he works out this sort of idea in far more detail.)
One thing that I've been thinking about recently is how the sort of "indeterminacy" that people talk about in quantum mechanics might relate to this setting. So I want to write a bit about this here.
Some caveats. First, this stuff clearly isn't going to be interpretation neutral. If you think Bohm gave the right account of quantum ontology, then you're not going to think there's much indeterminacy around. So I'll be supposing something like the GRW interpretation. Second, I'm not going to be metaphysically neutral even given this interpretation: there's going to be a bunch of other ways of thinking about the metaphysics of GRW that I don't consider here (I do think, however, that independently motivated metaphysics can contribute to the interpretation of a physical theory). Third, I'm only thinking of non-relativistic quantum theory here: Quantum field theory and the like is just beyond me at the moment. Finally, I'm on a steep learning curve with this stuff, so please excuse stupidities.
You can represent the GRW quantum ontology as a wave function over a certain space (configuration space). Mathematically speaking, that's a scalar field over a set of points (which then determines a measure over those points) in a high-dimensional space. As time rolls forward, the equations of quantum theory tell you how this field changes its values. Picture it as a wave evolving through time over this space. GRW tells you that at random intervals, this wave undergoes a certain drastic change, and this drastic change is what plays the role of "collapse".
That's all highly abstract. So let me try parlaying that into something more familiar to metaphysicians.
Suppose you're interested in a world with N particles in it, at time t. Without departing from classical modes of thinking yet, think of the possible arrangements of those particles at t: a scattering of particles equipped with mass and charge over a 3-dimensional space, say (think of the particles haecceistically for now). Collect all these possible-world-slices together into a set. There'll be a certain implicit ordering on this set: if the worlds contain nothing but those N massy and chargey particles located in space-time, then we can describe a world-slice w by giving, for each of the N particles, the coordinates of its location within w: that is, by giving a list of 3N coordinates. What this means is that each world can be regarded as a point in a 3N dimensional space (the first 3 dimensions giving the position of the first particle in w, the second 3 dimensions the position of the second, etc). And this is what I'm taking to be the "configuration space". So what is the configuration space, on the way I'm thinking of it? It's a certain set of time-slices of possible worlds.
One Bohmian picture of quantum ontology fits very naturally into the way that we usually think of possible worlds at this point. For Bohm says that one point in configuration space is special: it gives the actual positions of particles. And this fits the normal way of thinking of possible worlds: the special point in configuration space is just the slice of the actual world at t. (Bohmian mechanics doesn't dispense with the wave across configuration space, of course: just as some physical theories would appeal to objective chance in their natural laws, which we can represent as a measure across a space of possible worlds, Bohmianism appeals to a scalar field determining a measure across configuration space: the wavefunction).
But on the GRW interpretation, we don't get anything like this trad picture. What we have is configuration space and the wave function over it. Sometimes, the amplitude of that wave function is highly concentrated on a set of world-slices that are in certain respects very similar: say, they all contain particles arranged in a rough pointer-shaped in a certain location. But nevertheless, no single world will be picked out, and some amplitude will be given to sets of worlds which have the particles in all sorts of odd positions.
But of course, the framework for ontic vagueness I like is up for monkeying around with the actuality of worlds. There needn't be a single designated actual world, on the way I was thinking of things. But the picture I described doesn't exactly fit the present situation. For I supposed (following the supervaluationist paradigm) that there'd be a set of worlds, all of which would be "co-actual".
Yet there are other closely related models that'd help here. In particular, Lewis, Kamp and Edgington have described what I'll call a "degree supervaluationist" picture that looks to be exactly what we need. Here's the story, in the original setting. Your classical semantic theorist looks at the set of all possible interpretations of the language, and says that one among them is the designated (or "intended") one. Truth is truth at the unique, designated, interpretation. Your supervaluationist looks at the same space, and says that there's a set of interpretations with equal claim to be "intended": so they should all be co-designated. Truth is truth at each of the co-designated interpretations. Your degree-supervaluationist looks at the set of all interpretations, and says that some are better than others: they are "intended" to different degrees. So the way to describe the semantic facts is to give a measure over the space of interpretations that (roughly) gives in each case the degree to which a given interpretation is designated. Degree supervaluationism will share some of the distinctive features of the classical and standard supervaluational setups: for example, since classical tautologies are true at all interpretations, the law of excluded middle and the like will be "true to degree 1" (i.e. true on a set of interpretations of designation-measure 1).
I don't see any reason why we can't take this across to the worlds setting I favoured. Just as the traditional view is that there's a unique actual world among the space of possible worlds, and I argued that we can make sense of there sometimes being a set of coactual worlds among that space (with something being true if it is true at all of them), I now suggest that we should be up for there being some measure across the space of possible worlds, expressing the degree to which those worlds are actual.
The suggestion this is building up to is that we regard the measure determined by the wavefunction in GRW as the "actuality measure". Things are determinately the case to the extent that the set of worlds where they're true is assigned a high measure.
So, for example, suppose that the amplitude of the wavefunction is concentrated on worlds where Sparky is located within region R (suppose the measure of that space of world-slices is 0.9). Then it'll be determinately the case to degree 0.9 that Spark is in location R. Of course, in a set of worlds of measure 0.1, Sparky will be outside R. So it'll be determinately the case to degree 0.1 that Sparky is outside R. (Of course, it'll be determinate to degree 1 that Sparky is either inside R or outside R: at all the worlds, Sparky is located somewhere!)
I don't expect this to shed much light at all on what the wavefunction means. Ontic indeterminacy, many think, is a pretty obscure notion taken cold, and I'm not expecting metaphysicians or anyone else to find the notion of "degrees of actuality" something they recognize. So I'm not saying that there's any illuminating metaphysics of GRW here. I think the illumination is likely to go in the other direction: if you've can get a pre-philosophical grip on the "determinacy" and "no fact of the matter" talk in quantum physics, we've got a way of using that to explain talk of "degrees of actuality" and the like. Nevertheless, I think that, if this all works technically, then a bunch of substantive results follow. Here's a few thoughts in that direction:
- We've got a candidate for vagueness in the world, linked to a general story about how to think about ontic vagueness. Given ontic vagueness isn't in the best repute in the philosophical community, there's an important "existence result" in the offing here.
- Recall the idea canvassed earlier that "determinacy" or an equivalent might just be a metaphysical primitive. Well, here we have the suggestion that what amounts to (degrees of) determinacy being taken as a *physical* primitive. And taking the primitives of fundamental physics as a prima facie guide to metaphysical primitives is a well-trodden route, so I think some support for that idea could be found here.
- If there is ontic vagueness in the quantum domain, then we should be able to extract information about the appropriate way to think and reason in the presence of determinacy, by looking at an appropriately regimented version of how this goes in physics. And notice that there's no suggestion here that we go for a truth-functional degree theory with the consequent revisions of classical logic: rather, a variant of the supervaluational setup seems to me to be the best regimentation. If that's right, then it lends the support for the (currently rather hetrodox) supervaluational-style framework for thinking about metaphysical vagueness.
- I think that there's a bunch of alleged metaphysical implications of quantum theory that don't *obviously* go through if we buy into the sort of metaphysics of GRW just suggested. I'm thinking in particular about the allegation that quantum theory teaches us that certain systems of particles have "emergent properties" (Jonathan Shaffer has been using this recently as part of his defence of Monism). Bohmianism already shows, I guess, that this sort of claim won't be interpretation-neutral. But the above picture I think complicates the case for holism even within GRW.
(Thanks are owed to a bunch of people, particularly George Darby, for discussion of this stuff. They shouldn't be blamed for any misunderstands of the physics, or indeed, philosophy, that I'm making!)