Wednesday, June 13, 2007
converting LaTeX into word...
This leads to hours of heartache and potentially lots of typos, as I try ten ways of transferring the stuff over to my word processor. And I have to deal with getting logic into word, which is never nice. I used to use a special compiler to get it into html format, and then "save as" word. But that didn't actually save much time, so I've recently begun to just cut-and-paste the raw tex file, and reformat it and rewrite any code I've put in. I've downloaded a couple of trial applications that promise to convert stuff directly into doc, but with no success (they throw a wobbly whenever they meet any dollar signs, it seems).
Does anyone know what the best way to do this is? Would it help to get scientific word (more money to the man, I know, but at this stage I'm desperate).
Friday, June 08, 2007
Supervaluations and revisionism once more
The background is the orthodox view that supervaluational consequence will lead to revisions of classical logic. The strongest case I know for this (due to Williamson) is the following. Consider the claim "p&~Determinately(p)". This (it is claimed) cannot be true on any serious supervaluational model of our language. Equivalently, you can't have both p and ~Determinately(p) both true in a single model. If classical reductio were an ok rule of inference, therefore, you'd be able argue from ~Determinately(p) to ~p. But nobody thinks that's supervaluationally valid: any indeterminate sentence will be a counterexample to it. So classical reductio should be given up.
This is stronger than the more commonly cited argument: that supervaluational semantics vindicates the move from p to Determinately(p), but not the material conditional "if p then Determinately(p)" (a counterexample to conditional proof). The reason is that, if "Determinately" itself is vague, arguably the supervaluationist won't be committed to the former move. The key here is the thought that as well as things that are determinately sharpenings of our language, their may be interpretations which are borderline-sharpenings. Perhaps interpretation X is an "admissible interpretation of our language" on some sharpenings, but not on others. If p is true at all the definite sharpenings, but false at X, then that may lead to a situation where p is supertrue, but Determinately(p) isn't.
But orthodoxy says that this sort of situation (non-transitivity in the accessibility relation among interpretations of our language) does nothing to undermine the case for revisionism I mentioned in the first paragraph.
One thing I do in the paper is construct what seems to me a reasonable-looking toy semantics for a language, on which one can have both p and ~Determinately p. Here it is.
Suppose you have five colour patches, ranging from red to orange (non-red). Call them A,B,C,D,E.
Suppose that our thought and talk makes it the case that only interpretations which put the cut-off between B and D are determinately "sharpenings" of the language we use. Suppose, however, that there's some fuzziness around in what it is to be an "admissible interpretation". For example, an interpretation that places the cut-off between B and C, thinks that both interpretations placing the cut-off between C and D, and interpretations placing the cut-off between A and B, are admissible. And likewise, an interpretation that place the cut-off between C and D think that interpretations that place the cut-off between B and C are admissible, but also thinks that interpretations that place the cut-off between D and E are admissible.
Modelling the situation with four interpretations, labelled AB, BC, CD, DE, for where they place the red/non-red cut-off, we can express the thought like this: each intepretation accesses (thinks admissible) itself and its immediate neighbours, but nothing else. But BC and CD are the sharpenings.
My first claim is that all this is a perfectly coherent toy model for the supervaluationist: nothing dodgy or "unintended" is going on.
Now let's think about the truths values assigned to particular claims. Notice, to start with, that the claim "B is red" will be true at each sharpening. The claim "Determinately, B is red" will be true at the sharpening CD, but it won't be true at the sharpening BC, for that accesses an interpretation on which B counts as non-red (viz. AB).
Likewise, the claim "D is not red" will be true at each sharpening, but "Determinately, D is not red" will be true at the sharpening BC, but fails at CD, due to the latter seeing the (non-sharpening) interpretation DE, at which D counts as red.
In neither of these atomic cases do we find "p and ~Det(p)" coming out true (that's where I made a mistake previously). But by considering the following, we can find such a case:
Consider "B is red and D is not red". It's easy to see that this is true at each of the sharpenings, from what's been said above. But also "Determinately(B is red and D is not red)" is false at each of the sharpenings. It's false at BC because of the accessible interpretation AB at which B counts as non-red. It's false at CD because of the accessible interpretation DE at which D counts as red.
So we've got "B is red and D is not red, & ~Determinately(B is red and D is non-red)." And we've got that in a perfectly reasonable toy model for a language of colour predicates.
(Why do people think otherwise? Well, the standard way of modelling the consequence relation in settings where the accessibility relation is non-transitive is to think of the sharpenings as *all the interpretations accessible from some designated interpretation*. And that imposes additional structure which, for example, the model just sketch doesn't satisfy. But the additional structure seems to me totally unmotivated, and I provide an alternative framework in the paper for freeing oneself from those assumptions. The key thing is not to try and define "sharpening" in terms of the accessibility relation.).
The conclusion: the best extant case for (global) supervaluational consequence being revisionary fails.
Wednesday, June 06, 2007
Bohm and Lewis
What is Bohmianism? Well, to start with it's quite a familiar picture. There are a bunch of particles, each supplied with non-dynamical properties (like charge and mass) and definite positions, which move around in a familiar three-dimensional space. The actual trajectories of those particles, though, are not what you'd expect from a classical point of view: they don't trace straight lines through the space, but rather wobbly ones, if if they were bobbing around on some wave.
The other part of the Bohmian picture, I gather, is that one appeals to a wavefunction that lives in a space of far higher dimension: configuration space. As mentioned in a previous post I'm thinking of this as a set of (temporal slices of) possible worlds. The actual world is a point in configuration space, just as one would expect given this identification.
The first part of the Bohmian picture sounds all very safe from the metaphysician's perspective: the sort of world at which, for example, Lewis's project of Humean supervenience could get off and running, the sort of thing to give us the old-school worries about determinism and freedom (the evolution of a Bohmian world is totally deterministic). And so on and so forth.
But the second part is all a bit unexpected. What is a wave in modal space? Is that a physical thing (after all, it's invoked in fundamental physical theory)? How can a wave in modal space push around particles in physical space? Etc.
I'm sure there's lots of interesting phil physics and metaphysics to be done that takes the wave function seriously (I've started reading some of it). But I want to sketch a metaphysical interpretation of the above that treats it unseriously, for those of us with weak bellies.
The inspiration is Lewis's treatment of objective chance (as explained, for example, in his "Humean supervenience debugged"). The picture of chance he there sketches has some affinities to frequentism: when we describe what there is and how it is in fundamental terms, we never mention chances. Rather, we just describe patterns of instantiation: radioactive decay here, now, another radioactive decay there, then (for example). What one then has to work with is certain statistically regularities that emerge from the mosaic of non-chancy facts.
Now, it's very informative to be told about these regularities, but it's not obvious how to capture that information within a simple theory (we could just write down the actual frequencies, but that'd be pretty ugly, and wouldn't allow us to to capture underlying patterns among the frequencies). So Lewis suggests, when we're writing down the laws, we should avail ourselves of a new notion "P", assigning numbers to proposition-time pairs, obeying the usual probability axioms. We'll count a P-theory as "fitting" with facts (roughly) to the extent that the P-values it assigns to propositions match up, overall, to the statistically regularities we mentioned earlier. Thus, if we're told that a certain P-theory is "best", we're given some (cp) information on what the statistical regularities are. At not much gain in complexity, therefore, our theory gains enormously in informativeness.
The proposal, then, is that the chance of p at t is n, iff overall best theory assigns n to (p,t).
That's very rough, but the I hope the overall idea is clear: we can be "selectively instrumentalist" about some of the vocabulary that appears in fundamental physical theory. Though many of the physical primitives will also be treated as metaphysically basic (as expressing "natural properties") some bits that by the lights of independently motivated metaphysics are "too scary" can be regarded as just reflections of best theory, rather than part of the furniture of the world.
The question relevant here is: why stop at chance? If we've been able to get rid of one function over the space of possible worlds (the chance measure), why not do the same with another metaphysically troubling piece of theory: the wavefunction field.
Recall the first part of the Bohmian picture: particles moving through 3-space, in rather odd paths "as if guided by a wave". Suppose this was all there (fundamentally) was. Well then, we're going to be in a lot of trouble finding a decent way of encapsulating all this data about the trajectories of particles: the theory would be terribly unwieldy if we had to write out in longhand the exact trajectory. As before, there's much to be gained in informativeness if we allow ourselves a new notion in the formulation of overall theory, L, say. L will assign scalar values (complex numbers) to proposition-time pairs, and we can then use L in writing down the wavefunction equations of quantum mechanics which elegantly predicts the future positions of particles on the basis of their present positions. The "best" L-theory, of course will be that one whose predictions of the future positions of particles fits with the actual future-facts. The idea is that wavefunction talk is thereby allowed for: the wave function takes value z at region R of configuration space at time t iff Best L-theory assigns z to L(R,t).
So that's the proposal: we're selectively instrumentalist about the wavefunction, just as Lewis is selectively instrumentalist about objective chance (I'm using "instrumentalist" in a somewhat picturesque sense, by the way: I'm certainly not denying that chance or wavefunction talk has robust, objective truth-conditions.) There are, of course, ways of being unhappy with this sort of treatment of basic physical notions in general (e.g. one might complain that the explanatory force has been sucked from notions of chance, or the wavefunction). But I can't see anything that Humeans such as Lewis should be unhappy with here.
(There's a really nice paper by Barry Loewer on Lewisian treatments of objective chance which I think is the thing to read on this stuff. Interestingly, at the end of that paper he canvasses the possibility of extending the account to the "chances" one (allegedly) finds in Bohmianism. It might be that he has in mind something that is, in effect, exactly the position sketched above. But there are also reasons for thinking there might be differences between the two ideas. Loewer's idea turns on the idea that one can have something that deserves the name objective chance, even in a world for which there are deterministic laws underpinning what happens (as is the case for both Bohmianism, and for the chancy laws of statistically mechanics in a chancy world). I'm inclined to agree with Loewer on this, but even if that were given up, and one thought that the measure induced by the wavefunction isn't a chance-measure, the position I've sketched is still a runner: the fundamental idea is to use the Lewisian tactics to remove ideological commitment, not to use the Lewisian tactics to remove ideological commitment to chance specifically. [Update: it turns out that Barry definitely wasn't thinking of getting rid of the wavefunction in the way I canvass in this post: the suggestion in the cited paper is just to deal with the Bohmian (deterministic) chances in the Lewisian way])
[Update: I've just read through Jonathan Schaffer's BJPS paper which (inter alia) attacks the Loewer treatment of chance in Stat Mechanics and Bohm Mechanics (though I think some of his arguments are more problematic in the Bohmian case than the stat case.) But anyway, if Jonathan is right, it still wouldn't matter for the purposes of the theory presented here, which doesn't need to make the claim that the measure determined by the wavefunction is anything to do with chance: it has a theoretical role, in formulating the deterministic dynamical laws, that's quite independent of the issues Jonathan raises.]
Academic careers
Terence Tao - recent winner of the Field's medal (a sort of Nobel prize for mathematics) - has written some really interesting career advice. It's aimed at mathematicians, but lots of it is more generally applicable, and certainly lots of strikes a chord with academic philosophy. It's also not just for graduates: e.g. I'm a recent-graduate, and I'm sure there's lots there that I'm not doing, which it's good to be reminded of.
The advice to "use the wastebasket" is going to be more difficult now that the University of Leeds has decided to remove all wastebackets from our offices...
HT: Shawn Standefer, Richard Zach
p.s. here's one thing that struck me as particularly transferable:
"Don't prematurely obsess on a single "big problem" or "big theory". This is a particularly dangerous occupational hazard in this subject - that one becomes focused, to the exclusion of other mathematical activity, on a single really difficult problem in a field (or on some grand unifying theory) before one is really ready (both in terms of mathematical preparation, and also in terms of one career) to devote so much of one's research time to such a project. When one begins to neglect other tasks (such as writing and publishing one's "lesser" results), hoping to use the eventual "big payoff" of solving a major problem or establishing a revolutionary new theory to make up for lack of progress in all other areas of one's career, then this is a strong warning sign that one should rebalance one's priorities. While it is true that several major problems have been solved, and several important theories introduced, by precisely such an obsessive approach, this has only worked out well when the mathematician involved (a) has a proven track record of reliably producing significant papers in the area already, and (b) has a secure career (e.g. a tenured position). If you do not yet have both (a) and (b), and if your ideas on how to solve a big problem still have a significant speculative component (or if your grand theory does not yet have a definite and striking application), I would strongly advocate a more balanced approach instead: keep the big problems and theories in mind, and tinker with them occasionally, but spend most of your time on more feasible "low-hanging fruit", which will build up your experience, mathematical power, and credibility for when you are ready to tackle the more ambitious projects. "
Pictures from St Andrews (with added commentary)
you can find the originals from the link here
We had a great time in St Andrews, by the way. Two good conferences, lots of fun time spent with interesting people. And conference-accommodation to die for...
AJP paper
FWIW, the paper discusses a certain argument for the existence of structural universals (that is, universals "made out of" other universals, as "being water" might be thought to be made out of "being Hydrogen" "being Oxygen" etc.) The argument is based on the (alleged) possibility of worlds with no fundamental physical layer: where things "go down forever". Quite a few people use this argument in print, and many more raise it in conversation when you're pressing a microphysicalist metaphysics.
This is part of a wider project exploring a ontological microphysicalism, where the only things that really exist are the physical fundamentals. The recent stuff on ontological commitment is, in part, a continuation of that project.
On a more practical note, I can't figure out how you access AJP articles these days: my institution is supposed to have a subscription, but the links that take you to the pdf don't seem live. Any ideas of how to get into it would be gratefully received!
Vagueness and quantum stuff
(The idea of having supervaluation-style treatments of ontic vagueness isn't unknown in the literature however: in a couple of papers, Ken Akiba argues for this kind of treatment of ontic vagueness, though his route to this framework is pretty different to the one I like. And Elizabeth Barnes has been thinking and writing about the the kind of modal treatments of ontic vagueness for a while, and I owe huge amounts to conversations with her about all of these issues. Her take on these matters is very close to the one I like (non-coincidentally) and those interested should check out her papers for systematic discussion and defense of the coherence of ontic vagueness in this spirit.)
The project in my paper wasn't to argue that there was ontic vagueness, or even tell you what ontic vagueness (constitutively) is. The project was just to set up a framework for talking about, and reasoning about, metaphysically vague matters, with a particular eye to evaluate the Evans argument against ontically vague identity. In particular, the framework I gave has no chance of giving any sort of reduction of metaphysical indeterminacy, since that very notion was used in defining up bits of the framework. (I'm actually pretty attracted to the view that the right way to think about these things would be to treat indeterminacy as a metaphysical primitive, in the way that some modalists might treat contingency. See this previous blog post. I was later pointed to this excellent paper by David Barnett where he works out this sort of idea in far more detail.)
One thing that I've been thinking about recently is how the sort of "indeterminacy" that people talk about in quantum mechanics might relate to this setting. So I want to write a bit about this here.
Some caveats. First, this stuff clearly isn't going to be interpretation neutral. If you think Bohm gave the right account of quantum ontology, then you're not going to think there's much indeterminacy around. So I'll be supposing something like the GRW interpretation. Second, I'm not going to be metaphysically neutral even given this interpretation: there's going to be a bunch of other ways of thinking about the metaphysics of GRW that I don't consider here (I do think, however, that independently motivated metaphysics can contribute to the interpretation of a physical theory). Third, I'm only thinking of non-relativistic quantum theory here: Quantum field theory and the like is just beyond me at the moment. Finally, I'm on a steep learning curve with this stuff, so please excuse stupidities.
You can represent the GRW quantum ontology as a wave function over a certain space (configuration space). Mathematically speaking, that's a scalar field over a set of points (which then determines a measure over those points) in a high-dimensional space. As time rolls forward, the equations of quantum theory tell you how this field changes its values. Picture it as a wave evolving through time over this space. GRW tells you that at random intervals, this wave undergoes a certain drastic change, and this drastic change is what plays the role of "collapse".
That's all highly abstract. So let me try parlaying that into something more familiar to metaphysicians.
Suppose you're interested in a world with N particles in it, at time t. Without departing from classical modes of thinking yet, think of the possible arrangements of those particles at t: a scattering of particles equipped with mass and charge over a 3-dimensional space, say (think of the particles haecceistically for now). Collect all these possible-world-slices together into a set. There'll be a certain implicit ordering on this set: if the worlds contain nothing but those N massy and chargey particles located in space-time, then we can describe a world-slice w by giving, for each of the N particles, the coordinates of its location within w: that is, by giving a list of 3N coordinates. What this means is that each world can be regarded as a point in a 3N dimensional space (the first 3 dimensions giving the position of the first particle in w, the second 3 dimensions the position of the second, etc). And this is what I'm taking to be the "configuration space". So what is the configuration space, on the way I'm thinking of it? It's a certain set of time-slices of possible worlds.
One Bohmian picture of quantum ontology fits very naturally into the way that we usually think of possible worlds at this point. For Bohm says that one point in configuration space is special: it gives the actual positions of particles. And this fits the normal way of thinking of possible worlds: the special point in configuration space is just the slice of the actual world at t. (Bohmian mechanics doesn't dispense with the wave across configuration space, of course: just as some physical theories would appeal to objective chance in their natural laws, which we can represent as a measure across a space of possible worlds, Bohmianism appeals to a scalar field determining a measure across configuration space: the wavefunction).
But on the GRW interpretation, we don't get anything like this trad picture. What we have is configuration space and the wave function over it. Sometimes, the amplitude of that wave function is highly concentrated on a set of world-slices that are in certain respects very similar: say, they all contain particles arranged in a rough pointer-shaped in a certain location. But nevertheless, no single world will be picked out, and some amplitude will be given to sets of worlds which have the particles in all sorts of odd positions.
But of course, the framework for ontic vagueness I like is up for monkeying around with the actuality of worlds. There needn't be a single designated actual world, on the way I was thinking of things. But the picture I described doesn't exactly fit the present situation. For I supposed (following the supervaluationist paradigm) that there'd be a set of worlds, all of which would be "co-actual".
Yet there are other closely related models that'd help here. In particular, Lewis, Kamp and Edgington have described what I'll call a "degree supervaluationist" picture that looks to be exactly what we need. Here's the story, in the original setting. Your classical semantic theorist looks at the set of all possible interpretations of the language, and says that one among them is the designated (or "intended") one. Truth is truth at the unique, designated, interpretation. Your supervaluationist looks at the same space, and says that there's a set of interpretations with equal claim to be "intended": so they should all be co-designated. Truth is truth at each of the co-designated interpretations. Your degree-supervaluationist looks at the set of all interpretations, and says that some are better than others: they are "intended" to different degrees. So the way to describe the semantic facts is to give a measure over the space of interpretations that (roughly) gives in each case the degree to which a given interpretation is designated. Degree supervaluationism will share some of the distinctive features of the classical and standard supervaluational setups: for example, since classical tautologies are true at all interpretations, the law of excluded middle and the like will be "true to degree 1" (i.e. true on a set of interpretations of designation-measure 1).
I don't see any reason why we can't take this across to the worlds setting I favoured. Just as the traditional view is that there's a unique actual world among the space of possible worlds, and I argued that we can make sense of there sometimes being a set of coactual worlds among that space (with something being true if it is true at all of them), I now suggest that we should be up for there being some measure across the space of possible worlds, expressing the degree to which those worlds are actual.
The suggestion this is building up to is that we regard the measure determined by the wavefunction in GRW as the "actuality measure". Things are determinately the case to the extent that the set of worlds where they're true is assigned a high measure.
So, for example, suppose that the amplitude of the wavefunction is concentrated on worlds where Sparky is located within region R (suppose the measure of that space of world-slices is 0.9). Then it'll be determinately the case to degree 0.9 that Spark is in location R. Of course, in a set of worlds of measure 0.1, Sparky will be outside R. So it'll be determinately the case to degree 0.1 that Sparky is outside R. (Of course, it'll be determinate to degree 1 that Sparky is either inside R or outside R: at all the worlds, Sparky is located somewhere!)
I don't expect this to shed much light at all on what the wavefunction means. Ontic indeterminacy, many think, is a pretty obscure notion taken cold, and I'm not expecting metaphysicians or anyone else to find the notion of "degrees of actuality" something they recognize. So I'm not saying that there's any illuminating metaphysics of GRW here. I think the illumination is likely to go in the other direction: if you've can get a pre-philosophical grip on the "determinacy" and "no fact of the matter" talk in quantum physics, we've got a way of using that to explain talk of "degrees of actuality" and the like. Nevertheless, I think that, if this all works technically, then a bunch of substantive results follow. Here's a few thoughts in that direction:
- We've got a candidate for vagueness in the world, linked to a general story about how to think about ontic vagueness. Given ontic vagueness isn't in the best repute in the philosophical community, there's an important "existence result" in the offing here.
- Recall the idea canvassed earlier that "determinacy" or an equivalent might just be a metaphysical primitive. Well, here we have the suggestion that what amounts to (degrees of) determinacy being taken as a *physical* primitive. And taking the primitives of fundamental physics as a prima facie guide to metaphysical primitives is a well-trodden route, so I think some support for that idea could be found here.
- If there is ontic vagueness in the quantum domain, then we should be able to extract information about the appropriate way to think and reason in the presence of determinacy, by looking at an appropriately regimented version of how this goes in physics. And notice that there's no suggestion here that we go for a truth-functional degree theory with the consequent revisions of classical logic: rather, a variant of the supervaluational setup seems to me to be the best regimentation. If that's right, then it lends the support for the (currently rather hetrodox) supervaluational-style framework for thinking about metaphysical vagueness.
- I think that there's a bunch of alleged metaphysical implications of quantum theory that don't *obviously* go through if we buy into the sort of metaphysics of GRW just suggested. I'm thinking in particular about the allegation that quantum theory teaches us that certain systems of particles have "emergent properties" (Jonathan Shaffer has been using this recently as part of his defence of Monism). Bohmianism already shows, I guess, that this sort of claim won't be interpretation-neutral. But the above picture I think complicates the case for holism even within GRW.
(Thanks are owed to a bunch of people, particularly George Darby, for discussion of this stuff. They shouldn't be blamed for any misunderstands of the physics, or indeed, philosophy, that I'm making!)
Wednesday, April 25, 2007
Gavagai again again
Here's the blurb: Gavagai gets discussed all the time. But (unless I'm missing something in the literature) I've never seen an advocate of gavagai-style indeterminacy spell out in detail what exactly the deviant interpretations or translations are, that incorporating the different ways of dividing reference (over rabbits, rabbit-stages or undetached rabbit-parts). And without this it is to say the least, a bit hard to evaluate the supposed counterexamples to such interpretations! So the main job of the paper is to spell out, for a significant fragment of language, what the rival accounts of reference-division amount to.
One audience for the paper (who might not realize they are an audience for it initially) are folks interested in the stage theory/worm theory debate in the philosophy of persistence. The neuvo-Gavagai guy, according to me, is claiming that there's no fact of the matter whether our semantics is stage-theoretic or worm-theoretic. I think there's a reasonable chance that that he's right.
Stronger than this: so long as there are both 4D worms and instantaneous temporal parts thereof around (even if they're "dependent entities" or "rabbit histories" or "mere sums" as opposed to Real Objects), the Gavagai guy asks you to explain why our words don't refer to those worms or stages rather than whatever entity you think *really are* rabbits (say, enduring objects wholly present at each time).
By the way, even if these semantic indeterminacy results were right, I don't think that this forecloses the metaphysical debate about which of endurance, perdurance or exdurance is the right account of *persistence*. But I do think that it forces us to think hard about what the difference is between semantic and metaphysical claims, and what sort of reasons we might offer for either.
Parsimony and the fundamental (x-posted from metaphysical values)
In his APA comments on Jonathan Schaffer, Ross asks about some of Jonathan's ideas about the applicability of Ockham's razor. The question arises if you buy into some robust distinction between "fundamental" and "derivative" existents. Candidate fundamental existents: quarks, electrons, maybe organisms (or maybe just THE WORLD). Candidate derivative existents: weirdo fusions, impure sets, maybe tables and chairs (or maybe everything except THE WORLD).
Let's call the idea that "derivative" as well as "fundamental" entities are (thump table) existing things the expansivist interpretation of the fundamental/derivative distinction. Call the idea that only the fundamental (thump table) exists the restrictivist interpretation of that distinction.
Jonathan's position is that Ockham's razor, rightly understood, tells us to minimize the number of fundamental entities. Ross's idea (I think?) is that this is right iff one has a restrictivist understanding of the fundamental/derivative distinction. But Jonathan, pretty clearly, has an expansivist understanding of that distinction: he doesn't want to say that the only thing that (thump table) exists is the world, just that the world is ontologically prior to everything else. So if Ross is right, his application of parsimony is in trouble.
I can see what the idea is here: after all, understanding parsimony as the instruction to minimize (thump table) existents or to minimize the (thump table) kinds of existents is surely close to the traditional understanding. Whereas the idea that we need only minimize (kinds of) existents of such-and-such a type, seems to come a bit out of the blue, and at minimum we need some more explanation before we could accept that revision to our theoretical maxims.
However... One thing that seems important is to consider what sort of principles of parsimony might be present in more ordinary theorizing (e.g. in the special sciences). The appeal of appealing to parsimony in metaphysics is in large part that it's a general theoretical virtue, applicable in all sorts of areas that are paradigms of good, productive fields of inquiry. Now, theoretical virtues in the sciences is not a topic that I'm in a position to speak with authority on. But one thing that seems to me important in this connection: if you think that the entities of special sciences aren't fundamental entities, then principles of parsimony restricted to the fundamentals aren't going to be in a position to give you much bite. (NB: I think that this was raised by someone in comments on Jonathan's paper in Boise, but I can't remember who it was...).
If that's right, then whether you're an expansivist or a restrictivist about the fundamental/derivative distinction seems beside the point. Any theorist who gives a story about what the fundamentals are that's unconstrained by what the special sciences say, is going to be in trouble with the idea that principles of parsimony should be restricted to constraints on fundamental existents: for such principles of parsimony won't then be able to get much bite on theorizing in the special sciences. I'd like to think that quarks, leptons etc are going to populate the fundamental, rather than Jonathan's WORLD. This point bites me as much as Jonathan.
There's plenty of room for further discussion here, particularly the interaction of the above with what you take to be evidence for some entities being fundamental. E.g. if you thought that various types of emergentism in special science would be evidence for "higher level" fundamental entities, then maybe the above parsimony principle would still have application to special sciences: it'd tell you to reduce to the number of emergent entities you postulate (i.e. it'd be a methodological imperative towards reductionism).
Also, it seems to me that there is something to the thought that some entities are simply "don't cares" when applying parsimony principles. If I'm concerned with theorizing about the behaviour of various beetles in front of me, I care about how many kinds of beetles my theory is giving me, but not with how many kinds of mathematical entities I need to invoke in formulating that theory. Now, maybe that differential attitude can be explained away by pointing to the generality of the mathematica involved (e.g. that total science is "already committed to them"). But one natural take would be to look for restrictions to principles of parsimony/Ockham's razor, making them sensitive to the subject-matter under investigation.
To speculate wildly: If principles of parsimony do need to be sensitized in this way, and if the study of what fundamentally exists is a genuine investigation, maybe the principle of parsimony, in application to that study, really would tell us to minimize the number of, and kinds of, fundamental entities we posit.
Monday, April 09, 2007
APA return
The APA was really fun. Highlights for me included the Hudson-fest, featuring comments from Josh Parsons, Mark Heller and Michael Rae, and interesting replies to each from Hud. Also the author-meets-critics session on dialethism which Brit mentions here. I've been thinking a lot about open futures following Brit's talk on sea battle semantics, and may have some thoughts to post soon (on the plane over to Atlanta, my frantic drawing of dots and arrows trying to figure out how counterfactuals interact with open future semantics convinced my neighbour I was an astrophysicist. Must be the big axes with "time" and "reality" on them...). Andy Egan gave two really interesting papers, on fragmented minds and aesthetic disagreement, and I really enjoyed Alyssa Ney's talk on how different theories of causation fit together (or not). And lots more nice people met and good stuff talked about!
It was fun also meeting various bloggers for the first time in the flesh.
The tale of the 14 philosophers and the limousine is already legendary, I gather (I wasn't there).
Tuesday, April 03, 2007
San Francisco
I think food may be in order, then recovery before the hard philosophical slog restarts...
Monday, April 02, 2007
To the APA
One thing that was kind of surprising to me is that there weren't many people defending the sort of "realist Quinean" view that I (along with a lot of people) took to be the orthodoxy. Carnapians (of various flavours), Aristotelians, and the like were more in evidence.
I found the framework and ideas in Dave Chalmers' "Ontological anti-realism" paper particularly stimulating. It suggests to me some nice ways of extending some of the views I have on ontic vagueness. Lots to think about.
Anyway, I'm now about to get on a plane for San Francisco, for the Pacific APA. It was very exciting seeing the Pacific for the first time as I flew in to SF on the way to Boise; I'm really looking forward to seeing the city and attending the conference.
Friday, March 30, 2007
West coast journeying
I didn't mean to be still here. A combination of tiredness, lack of care with a watch, and (I suspect) there being different timezones in different terminals, mean that I missed my connecting flight.
On the positive side, I was happily making notes on excellent metametaphysics papers while missing my flight. Still, an all-things-considered bad, I think.
But the nice people at Delta rebooked me, and (modulo a taxi journey and quite possibly sleeping at San Jose airport) my travel plans are back in the swing.
So long as I don't miss another flight through blogging...
Monday, March 26, 2007
Probabilistic multi-conclusion validity
The standard result is the following (where the uncertainty of p is 1-probability of p):
An argument is classically valid
iff
for all classical probability functions, the sum of the uncertainties of the premises is at least as great as the uncertainty of the conclusion.
It'll help if we restate this as follows:
An argument is classically valid
iff
for all classical probability functions, the sum of the uncertainties of the premises + the probability of the conclusion is at least 1.
Stated this way, there's a natural generalization available:
A multi-conclusion argument is classically valid
iff
for all classical probability functions, the sum of the uncertainties of the premises + the probabilities of the conclusions is greater than or equal to 1.
And once we've got it stated, it's a corollary of the standard result (I believe).
It's pretty easy to see directly that this works in the "if" direction, just by considering classical probability functions which only assign 1 or 0 to propositions.
In the "only if" direction (writing u for uncertainty and p for probability)
Consider A,B|=C,D. This holds iff A,B,~C,~D|= holds by a standard premise/conclusion swap result. And we know u(~C)=p(C), u(~D)=p(D). By the standard result, the sum of uncertainties of the premises of a single-conclusion argument must be greater than that of the conclusion. That is, the single-conc argument holds iff u(A)+u(B)+u(~C)+u(~D) is greater than equal to 1. But by the above identification, this holds iff u(A)+u(B)+p(C)+p(D) is greater than or equal to 1. This should generalize to arbitrary cases. QED.
Sunday, March 25, 2007
Naturalness in Idaho (x-post from MV)
Together with Iris Einheuser, I'm going to be responding to Ted Sider's paper "Which disputes are substantive?". It's been great to have a serious think about the way that Ted thinks of this stuff, and how it relates to the Kit Fine inspired setting that I've been working on lately.
Anyway, the whole writing-a-response thing got way out of hand, and I've ended up with a 7,500 word first draft. I do think there's a couple of substantive issues raised therein for the kind of framework (otherwise really really attractive) that he's been pushing here and in recent work. The worry centres around quantification into the scope of Ted's "naturalness" operator. For any who are interested, I've put the draft response up online.
After the INPC, I'll be in San Fran for the Pacific APA, along with many other CMM and Leeds folks.
Friday, March 09, 2007
Fundamental and derivative truths
I've been thinking about this material a lot lately, but I've found it surprisingly different to formulate and explain. I can see how everything fits together: just not sure how best to go about explaining it to people. Different people react to it in such different ways!
The paper does a bunch of things:
- offering an interpretation of Kit Fine's distinction between things that are really true, and things that are merely true. (So, e.g. tables might exist, but not really exist).
- using Agustin Rayo's recent proposal for formulating a theory of requirements/ontological commitments in explication.
- putting forward a general strategy for formulating nihilist-friendly theories of requirements (set theoretic nihilism and mereological nihilisms being the illustrative cases used in the paper).
- using this to give an account of "postulating" things into existence (e.g. sets, weirdo fusions).
- sketching a general answer to the question: in virtue of what do our sentences have the ontological commitments they do (i.e. what makes a theory of requirements *the correct one* for this or that language?)
I'm going to be talking in more detail about the case of mereological nihilism at the CMM structure in metaphysics workshop.
Thresholds for belief
One worry about threshold accounts is that they’ll make constraints on binary beliefs look very weird. Consider, for example, the lottery paradox. I am certain that someone will win, but for each individual ticket, I’m almost certain that it’s a loser. Suppose that having belief of degree n sufficed for binary belief. Then, by choosing a big enough lottery, we can make it that I believe a generalization (there will be a winner) while believing the negation of each of its premises. So I believe each of a logically inconsistent set.
This sort of situation is very natural from the graded belief perspective: the beliefs in question meet constraints of probabilistic coherence. But there’s a strong natural thought that binary beliefs should be constrained to be logically consistent. And of course, the threshold account doesn’t deliver this.
What Christensen points to is some observations by Kyburg about limited consistency results that can be derived from the threshold account. Minimally, binary beliefs are required to be weakly consistent: for any threshold above zero, one cannot believe a single contradictory proposition. But there are stronger results too. For example, for any threshold above 0.5, one cannot believe a pair of mutually contradictory propositions. One can see why this is if one remembers the following result: that a logically valid argument is such that the improbability of its conclusion cannot be greater than the sum of the improbabilities of its premises. For the case where the conclusion is absurd (i.e. the premises are contradictory) we get the the sum of the improbabilities of the premises must be less than or equal to 1.
In general, then, what we get is the following: if the threshold for binary belief is at least 1-1/n, then one cannot believe each of an inconsistent set of n propositions.
Here’s one thought. Let’s suppose that the threshold for binary belief is context dependent in some way (I mean here to use this broadly, rather than committing to some particularly potentially controversial semantic analysis of belief attributions). The threshold that marks the shift to binary belief can vary depending on aspects of the context. The thought, crudely put, is that there’ll be the following constraint on what thresholds can be set: in a context where n propositions are being entertained, then the threshold for binary belief must be at least 1-1/n.
[As Christensen emphasises, this is not the same thing as getting closure holding in every context. Suppose we consider the three propositions, A, B, and A&B. Consistency means that we cannot accept the first two and accept the negation of the last. And indeed, with the threshold set at 2/3, we get this result. But closure would tell us that every situation in which we believe the first two, we should believe the last. But it’s quite consistent to believe A and B (say, by having credence 2/3 in each) and to fail to believe A&B (say, by having credence 1/3 in this proposition). Probabilistic coherence isn’t going to save the extendability of beliefs by deduction, for any reasonable choice of threshold.
Of course, if we allow a strong notion of disbelief or rejection, such that someone disbelieves that p iff their uncertainty of p is past the threshold (the same threshold as for belief), then we’ll be able to read off from the consistency constraint that in a valid argument, if one believes the premises, one should abandon disbelief in the conclusion. This is not closure, but perhaps it might sweeten the pill of giving up on closure.]
Without logical consistency being a pro tanto normative constraint on believing, I’m sceptical that we’re really dealing with a notion of binary belief at all. Suppose this is accepted. Then we can use the considerations above to argue (1) that if the threshold account of binary belief is right, then thresholds (if not extreme) must be context dependent, since for no choice of threshold less than 1 will consistency be upheld. (2) that there’s a natural constraint on thresholds in terms of the number of propositions obtained.
The minimal conclusion, for this threshold theorist, is that the more propositions they entertain, the harder it will be for them to count as beliefs. Consider the lottery paradox construed this way:
1 loses
2 loses
…
N loses
So: everyone loses
Present this as the following puzzle: We can believe all the premises, and disbelieve the conclusion, yet the latter is entailed by the former.
We can answer this version of the lottery paradox using the resources described above. In a context where we’re contemplating this many propositions, the threshold for belief is so high that we won’t count as believing the individual props. But we can explain why it seems so compelling: entertain each individually, and we will believe it (and our credences remain fixed throughout).
Of course, there’s other versions of the lottery paradox that we can formulate, e.g. relying on closure, for which we have no answer. Or at least, our answer is just to reject closure as a constraint on rational binary beliefs. But with a contextually variable threshold account, as opposed to a fixed threshold account, we don’t have to retreat any further.
Thursday, March 08, 2007
Supervaluational consequence again
I’ve just finished a new version of my paper supervaluational consequence. A pdf version is available here. I thought I'd post something explaining what's going on therein.
Let’s start at the beginning. Classical semantics requires, inter alia, the following. For every expression, there has to be a unique intended interpretation. This single interpretation will assign to each name, a single referent. To each predicate, it will assign a set of individuals. Similarly for other grammatical categories.
But sometimes, the idea that there are such unique referents, extensions and so on, looks absurd. What supervaluationism (in the liberal sense I’m interested in) gives you is the flexibility to accommodate this. Supervaluationism requires, not a single intended interpretation, but a set of interpretations.
So if you’re interested in the problem of the many, and think that there’s more than one optimal candidate referent for “Kilimanjaro”; if you’re interested in theory change, and think that relativist and rest mass are equi-optimal candidate properties to be what “mass” picks out; if you are interested in inscrutability of reference, and think that rabbit-slices, undetached rabbit parts as well as rabbits themselves are in the running to be in the extension of “rabbit”; if you’re interested in counterfactuals, and think that it’s indeterminate which world is the closest one where Bizet and Verdi were compatriots; if you think vagueness can be analyzed as a kind of multiple-candidate indeterminacy of reference; if you find any of these ideas plausible, then you should care about supervaluationism.
It would be interesting, therefore, if supervaluationism undermined the tenants of the kind of logic that we rely on. For either, in the light of the compelling applications of supervaluationism, we will have to revise our logic to accommodate these phenomena; or else supervaluationism as a theory of these phenomena is itself misconceived. Either way, there’s lots at stake.
Orthodoxy is that supervaluationism is logically revisionary, in that it involves admitting counterexamples to some of the most familiar classical inferential moves: conditional proof, reductio, argument by cases, contraposition. There’s a substantial hetrodox movement which recommends a hetrodox way of defining supervaluational consequence (so called “local consequence”) which is entirely non-revisionary.
My paper aims to do a number of things:
- to give persuasive arguments against the local consequence heterodoxy
- to establish, contra orthodoxy, that standard supervaluational consequence is not revisionary (this, granted a certain assumption)
- to show that, even if the assumption is refused, the usual case for revisionism is flawed
- to give a final fallback option: even if supervaluational consequence is revisionary, it is not damagingly so, for it in no way involves revision of inferential practice.
It convinces me that supervaluationists shouldn't feel bad: they probably don't revise logic, and if they do, it's in a not-terribly-significant way.
Monday, February 19, 2007
Back!
On the research side, I was down in Oxford on Friday giving a talk to the departmental Philosophical Society on "Semantics for nihilists". This is a paper that's turning into a more general project of showing how to get truths about macro-objects, or sets, say, without having to having to admit macro-objects into ones ontology. As I think of these things, the real issue here concerns the nature of ontological commitment (Agustin Rayo's recent papers convinced me of this). I'm planning to write up this stuff at the next available opportunity. I'm giving it again at a "Structure in Metaphysics" workshop here in Leeds, soon.
I'm also in the process of organizing my trip to Boise, Idaho, for the metametaphysics conference there.
Finally, on the news front: I'm going to be on research leave next year, courtesy of those nice people of the AHRC. It's for a project called "Intrinsic survival, multiple survival, vague survival", which takes on a cluster of issues, including intrinsicality, ontic vagueness, fission cases, and the problem of the many. One part of the application was to give regular research updates on this blog, so I'm committed to keep this active while on leave!

